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Abstract: 
 
I use the case of religious belief to argue that communal institutions are crucial to 
successfully transmitting knowledge to a broad public. The transmission of maximally 
counterintuitive religious concepts can only be explained by reference to the communities 
that sustain and pass them on. The shared life and vision of such communities allows 
believers to trust their fellow adherents. Repeated religious practices provide reinforced 
exposure while the comprehensive and structured nature of religious worldviews helps to 
limit distortion. I argue that the phenomenon of theological incorrectness noted by many 
cognitive scientists of religion is not as worrisome as it may appear. Believers may be 
employing models that are good enough for practical knowledge, as much of the relevant 
sociological evidence suggests. Further, communities can help us both in acquiring our initial 
beliefs and in correcting our errors. 
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1. Introduction: Conditions for Transmission 
Contemporary epistemologists typically offer norms for testimonial exchanges that 
are supposed to provide sufficient conditions for passing on knowledge.1 However, meeting 
these norms (e.g. having a sincere and competent speaker addressing a receptive hearer) is 
often not enough to consistently and effectively transmit knowledge over time, particularly 
when passing on complex and counterintuitive claims to a broad population. Students do 
not always learn what knowledgeable teachers tell them, even when they trust their teachers. 
Further, those who do learn often fail to retain their knowledge. For example, those who 
have successfully taken high school or college physics courses often give intuitive but wrong 
answers when asked to predict the motion of objects (McCloskey and Kohl, 1983). The 
problem here is not a lack of confidence in the sources from which they learned, but the 
challenge of fully assimilating difficult concepts. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Most discussions of testimony take a one-one exchange between an individual speaker and an 
individual hearer as their model (recent influential accounts include Lackey 2008 and Fricker 1994; see Greco 
2012 for an opinionated survey of the state of the field). Linda Zagzebski’s discussion of epistemic authority 
and the role of communities in belief is a recent exception (2012). 
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If our goal is to figure out how knowledge is effectively passed on through 
testimony, we need more than just an account of the relevant norms that hearers and 
speakers should satisfy. We also need to articulate the practices and supports that enable 
people to receive and retain knowledge from testimonial sources. Ethics needs to consider 
not just what ethical norms are, but also how they relate to human moral psychology, so that 
we can effectively live out and act upon them. So too, epistemology needs to consider not 
just what testimonial norms are, but also how these norms relate to human cognition, so that 
we can develop ecologies that successfully transmit and reinforce knowledge. 
This is particularly important when it comes to beliefs about reality and our place in 
it, the kind of beliefs that orient and guide us. Testimonial transmission plays a crucial role in 
two of the most influential sources for forming such beliefs, science and religion. Almost all 
of us get most of our religious and scientific information from small groups of scientists, 
religious leaders, and those who communicate on these subjects. Can the religious and 
scientific concepts of these small groups be successfully passed on to a wider public 
audience? 
I will argue that communal institutions are vital to realizing this possibility. They can 
help members of the community assimilate challenging beliefs by presenting them repeatedly 
in a variety of contexts. Recognizing the importance of these social and communal factors 
allows us to be more humble about the extent of our own personal contributions to 
achieving and preserving knowledge. Developing strong ecologies of knowledge and being 
an active member of epistemic communities is a key part of intellectual humility: it is only 
through such participation that we can properly benefit from what others know.  
On my view, there are three key factors that enable general transmission to be 
successful.2 All three of them can best be met in communities. The first has to do with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 These factors are not intended to be either necessary or sufficient conditions. In some instances, 
transmission can succeed even though these conditions are not met. Conversely, meeting these conditions does 
not ensure that the vast majority of hearers will successfully receive the message (facts about the content of the 
transmission and the status of the hearers make a significant difference). My claim is that they are key factors 
insofar as they significantly increase the probability of successful transmission to a broad population and play 
an important role in explaining testimonial success. An example of a key factor of this sort would be the 
relationship between winning hockey games and having more shots than the opposing team, as measured by 
metrics like Corsi and Fenwick (“Stats Made Simple Part 1: Corsi & Fenwick,” accessed July 15, 2016, 
http://www.secondcityhockey.com/2013/12/4/5167404/nhl-stats-made-simple-part-1-corsi-fenwick; NHL, 
“Enhanced Statistics,” accessed July 15, 2016, http://www.nhl.com/stats/enhanced). Having more shots is 
predictive of success and is a causal factor in explaining winning, but it is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
victory. 
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hearers’ attitude towards the speaker. In general, hearers need to trust their sources to 
receive knowledge; they need to be convinced of their good will and competence. This is the 
Trust Condition. Most epistemologists of testimony acknowledge some version of this 
condition. When it is not met, the hearer is not in a position to receive knowledge, even if 
the speaker has it.3 The trust requirement is particularly relevant in the case of general 
transmission, because here most of us do not have enough independent knowledge to learn 
from those we do not trust, in the way that experts might be able to. If we suspect that the 
speakers have different goals and values, we may discount what they tell us and fail to 
receive knowledge. 
Secondly, we need sufficient access to the knowledge, including clear initial 
communication and repeated reminders. We easily forget something that we only hear once, 
so claims, particularly ones that we only make use of occasionally, need to be repeated and 
reinforced. This is the Reinforced Exposure Condition. Clarity is important for meeting this 
condition. The more complex the idea, the more repetition and varied exposition required to 
give us sufficient access to it. In the case of knowledge that is to be communicated to the 
general public, we need avenues of transmission that will consistently and accurately 
communicate claims so that the public gets sufficient opportunity to receive them. Accounts 
of testimony that take one-off informational exchanges as paradigmatic often miss out on 
the importance of this condition for actual transmission. 
Thirdly, even if the hearers trust the speakers and are repeatedly exposed to their 
testimony, the mode of communication and the way it is received need to possess sufficient 
fidelity. This is the Minimal Distortion Condition. If the way knowledge is communicated 
modifies or obscures its content or implications, then the transmission fails. This is of 
particular importance for public communication, where the goal is distributing knowledge to 
almost everyone. Here, again, clarity is important, as is differentiation. To avoid distortion, 
you will need to have clear and well-defined messages that distinguish between what is 
central and what is peripheral in a way that almost everyone can hear and understand. 
Further, to successfully assimilate and use these messages we often need to repeatedly be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 If I think you are incompetent at identifying birds, then I cannot come to know that this bird is a 
Western scrub jay on the basis of your testimony. Further, even if I think you are competent, I cannot come to 
know if I am not convinced of your goodwill and sincerity, as in Jennifer Lackey’s example of the 
untrustworthy whale-watching captain, who knows that whales were sighted yesterday, but would have told me 
that even if it were false (2006, 436–437). 
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corrected. As we will see, cognitive science suggests that in many cases the goal will be to 
have conceptions that are less wrong, not ones that are perfect.  
I will use the case of religious beliefs to argue that communities are central to 
meeting these three conditions and enabling successful transmission of knowledge to a 
broad public. The transmission of many religious concepts, particularly maximally 
counterintuitive concepts, depends on the communal practice of religion. The persistence of 
these beliefs cannot be explained other than by reference to the communities that sustain 
and pass them on throughout the centuries. I argue that the phenomenon of theological 
incorrectness noted by many proponents of cognitive science of religion (CSR) is not as 
worrisome as it may appear. Even if many believers exhibit some theological incorrectness 
when explaining and applying their religious beliefs, they may still be employing models that 
are good enough for practical knowledge, as much of the relevant sociological evidence 
suggests. On my view, our goal as those learning from others (whether in science or religion) 
should be to have beliefs that are open to correction and that can serve the requisite 
purposes, even if they are underdeveloped or even somewhat incorrect. Communities help 
us both in acquiring our initial beliefs and in correcting our errors. 
2. Religious Concepts: The Minimally and the Maximally Counterintuitive 
Why focus on the case of religious beliefs, particularly since many philosophers 
would deny that there is, in fact, any religious knowledge?4 There are several reasons to do 
so. Religious beliefs are typically formed in social contexts: in families and local 
communities. Religion is clearly a sphere where social dynamics play a large role, so we can 
see what communities can do. Further, many religions have existed and continued to adapt 
over millennia, giving us evidence about religious stability or instability over time. There are 
few other belief systems with similar records of both change and persistence. Scholars have 
also engaged in extensive comparative study of religions, examining which elements show up 
repeatedly across cultures and which seem to be more idiosyncratic to a particular religion. 
By contrast, highly specialized, labor and capital intensive, institutionalized scientific research 
is a recent innovation, as are the means for transmitting the results of such investigation. It is 
only in the last seventy years that some countries have begun to require upper secondary 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 My interest is in the conditions needed for successful transmission in addition to the epistemic qualities the 
testifier needs, so I am not going to discuss to what extent religious or scientific communities meet all the 
conditions for good testifiers, but discuss what they need to do to transmit knowledge, proceeding from the 
conditional assumption that some of them are good testifiers. 
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education, the minimum level necessary for attaining knowledge of most sciences.5 Thus our 
information concerning how successful science education can or should be or what levels of 
comprehension it can achieve is actually quite limited. Looking at the transmission of 
religious beliefs can help us to see the role that communities play and what they can or 
cannot do.6 
CSR Scholars have argued that many religious ideas are easy to pass on and retain 
because they fit with humans’ intuitive or maturationally natural conceptions. Justin Barrett 
notes that many 
religious concepts, including concepts of gods, ghosts, and spirits, may be counted 
within a large class of concepts I have termed “minimally counterintuitive” (MCI) 
concepts. These MCIs may be characterized as meeting most of the assumptions that 
describers and categorizers generate—thus being easy to understand, remember, and 
believe—but as violating just enough of these assumptions to be attention demanding 
and to have an unusually captivating ability to assist in the explanation of certain 
experiences. These MCIs commonly occupy important roles in mythologies, legends, 
folktales, religious writings, and stories of peoples all over the world. (Barrett 2004; cf. 
Boyer 2001; McCauley 2011) 
 
These concepts take a maturationally natural notion that most humans possess, like the 
concept of an intentional agent, and tweak it slightly (e.g. a spirit or ghost as an invisible 
intentional agent that otherwise possesses the characteristics we intuitively ascribed to 
intentional agents). However, not all religious concepts fall in this category: some concepts 
such as an atemporal deity or a triune God are very counterintuitive. They depart severely 
from the intuitive ontology with which most humans operate.  
Many proponents of CSR predict that religions that involve such maximally 
counterintuitive beliefs will either die out or be modified so that their beliefs become less 
counterintuitive. They present both anthropological studies and controlled experiments to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Less than 50% of those born in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) countries (which have the highest rates of higher education) in the 1930s completed upper secondary 
education (i.e. the equivalent of American high school) and only around 15% completed tertiary education 
(OECD 2011, p. 14, chart 1, http://www.oecd.org/education/skills-beyond-school/48642586.pdf). In 2013, in 
OECD countries 33.3% of 25-64 year olds had completed tertiary education (including technical training and 
non-university degrees), 44.0% had completed upper secondary education and 23.5% had only completed 
below upper secondary education (https://data.oecd.org/eduatt/adult-education-level.htm#indicator-chart). 
6 Further, if the skeptic of religion is right and all the maximally counterintuitive religious beliefs I 
discuss below are false, then their transmission over time becomes even more impressive evidence for the 
ability of communities to successfully transmit their beliefs. If a well-organized community can do that with a 
false and maximally counterintuitive belief, then surely a well-organized community could do just as well with a 
true but counterintuitive belief. 
Cohoe w Getting Things Less Wrong http:// dx.doi.org/ 10.11612/ resphil.2016.93.3.3   6 
support this claim (e.g. Barrett and Keil 1996, Barrett 1998). Jason Slone, for example, 
presents the case of Buddhist (a)theology. Many learned exponents of Buddhism present it 
as a non-theistic religion or philosophy and claim that true Buddhists do not attribute divine 
attributes to Buddha. But, Slone claims, scholars of lived Buddhism find that, in practice, 
both Buddhist lay people and Buddhist monks and nuns conceive of Buddha “as having 
many of the characteristics of deities in other religions” and perform rituals designed to 
acquire special status or bring about miraculous outcomes (Slone 2004, 74-75 and the works 
he cites). This suggests that it may be hard or impossible to consistently transmit religious 
concepts that are not MCIs.  
Whether counterintuitive concepts can be successfully transmitted to a wide population 
over time is an important question for science as well as religion. Many, if not most, 
scientific concepts are quite counterintuitive, which can make transmitting them challenging, 
as in the intuitive physics of motion example I mentioned above. Some CSR scholars go 
quite far in claiming that counterintuitive concepts cannot successfully be transmitted. For 
example, Pascal Boyer speaks of the “mirage of theological correctness.” (281) He claims 
that “people always add to or distort the doctrine,” (281) adding that, “it is very difficult for 
literate groups to counter people’s tendency to make their religious concepts more local and 
more practical. People are never as ‘theologically correct’ as the guild would like them to be.” 
(283) Now, religious institutions can try to counter this by emphasizing and enforcing 
doctrine but, in Boyer’s view, “the only way to make the message immune to such 
adulteration renders it tedious, thereby fueling imagistic dissent and threatening the position 
of the theologian’s guild.” (285)  
Here Boyer is drawing on the work of the anthropologist Harvey Whitehouse. 
Whitehouse distinguishes between two modes of transmission. The first mode is an imagistic 
one that involves intense, high-arousal rituals that effectively bond group members together, 
but are open to a variety of interpretations. The doctrinal mode, by contrast, offers a 
coherent, systematic, and frequently repeated set of messages. 7  The challenge for the 
doctrinal mode is to navigate between two dangers. On the one hand, if group leaders are 
too rigid and demanding in policing practitioners’ beliefs, people may become discouraged 
and disengaged: the tedium effect. On the other hand, if leaders are too lax in training and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Whitehouse 1995, 2000. On his view, this mode can be particularly effective when carried out with 
the aid of written texts and formal instruction, though it is also present in non-literate societies. 
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safeguarding practitioners’ beliefs, then people will simplify and distort the official teaching 
to make them more minimally counterintuitive, what Whitehouse calls the “cognitive 
optimum effect.” (2004) 
Boyer is quite skeptical that a successful mean can be found. In section 4a, I will 
consider whether the evidence backs him up. For now, I want to note an issue about what 
counts as evidence against the possession of a belief. Boyer seems to assume that any 
evidence of practitioners using theologically incorrect conceptions counts as evidence that 
they do not, in fact, hold the theologically correct beliefs. This is clearly too quick: while I 
may use the physically incorrect belief that the sun is moving downwards to estimate how 
soon it will set, my use of this belief does not signal a rejection of the earth’s rotation. My 
naïve representation of the sun’s motion is simply easier to use and it is sufficient for the 
practical knowledge I am interested in about how long I have until the sun’s light disappears. 
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3. Religious Knowledge Transmission 
a. Goals of Transmission: Practical vs. Theoretical Knowledge 
This points to the importance of the distinction between theoretical and practical 
knowledge (Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VI.1-3, 7). Religions often transmit 
comprehensive accounts of reality, and thus can serve as a source for beliefs about the way 
things are. The goal of such beliefs is theoretical knowledge or understanding in the 
Aristotelian sense: knowledge whose value is intrinsic and consists in what it enables us to 
appreciate about reality. Incorrect or misleading concepts rule out or at least impair such 
theoretical knowledge. The goal of practical knowledge, by contrast, is successful action. 
Religions often provide actionable information about what to do. For practical knowledge to 
succeed, it has to be good enough for action-guiding purposes. It does not, however, need to 
be complete or even correct, as the setting sun example indicates. Thus whether religious 
knowledge is being successfully transmitted depends not simply on whether the concepts the 
practitioners employ are entirely correct, but on whether they are good enough for the 
required purposes.8 
The diversity of religions is a complicating factor here: religions operate in many 
different ways and their different goals affect what sort of knowledge they may be trying to 
transmit.9 While many offer some view of reality as well as practical guidance, the relative 
emphases on theoretical and practical claims differ significantly. Some may have a well-
defined view of the nature of reality that is centrally used for their practical knowledge (e.g. 
the Buddhist view that the central problem of life is suffering and that the way to avoid 
suffering is to banish desire) or well-defined creeds that propose truths about reality (e.g. the 
role of the ecumenical creeds in many traditional Christian communities). Other kinds of 
religion may have detailed practices that adherents engage in, but without specifically 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 You can have a conception that is sufficient for practical purposes but insufficient for theoretical 
purposes. For example, in a recent NSF survey only 51% of respondents correctly identified as false the claim 
that Antibiotics kill viruses as well as bacteria (NSB 2014, Chapter 7, Appendix table 7-9). Nevertheless, many 
people still have the practical knowledge that they should follow the doctor’s instruction. So here we have 
something close to success on the level of practical knowledge—most people know that they should follow the 
doctor’s instruction—but widespread failure when it comes to theoretical knowledge—few know what viruses 
or antibiotics are. 
9 There is continuing scholarly debate over whether the notion of “religion” is useful and how it 
should be applied. See, for example, the discussion in Boyer 2001, 4-57: in any case, religions are certainly not 
all members of a well-defined natural kind. 
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formulated theoretical accounts of reality that their adherents are expected to adopt. Exactly 
what theoretical commitments are involved is often subject to debate within communities.10  
b. Ecologies of religious knowledge 
There are also two rather different sorts of ecologies of knowledge that are relevant. 
Those outside of a religious community often know little about it, and may not be aware of 
even knowing someone of that religion. The current distribution of religious adherents 
influences this: according to a 2012 Pew report, “nearly three-quarters (73%) of the world’s 
people live in countries in which their religious group makes up a majority of the 
population.” 11  Further, media reporting on religion focuses on the sensational and 
controversial and is often conducted by people with an incomplete understanding of the 
religion they are covering. 
c. How Religious Communities Can Meet Transmission Conditions 
Billions of people are part of religious communities that meet regularly and go 
through life together. While the details vary, in general, religious communal practices provide 
a way of transmitting both theoretical and practical knowledge from trusted sources to 
members of the community. Those who are active participants in a religious community 
have several advantages. To begin with, communal religious life provides regular means of 
transmitting the central views of the religion. This means that many religious communities 
will meet the Reinforced Exposure Condition: since members of these communities are 
repeatedly exposed to the central practical and theoretical claims of their tradition. 
Members can also rely on other members of their community for advice and guidance. 
Religious communities are formed around shared visions of reality, shared moral views, and 
shared practices. Dedicated religious adherents can be reasonably confident that they have 
similar goals and aims and are weighing things similarly to their co-religionists. This means 
that the Trust Condition will be met for many religious participants: they trust the good will 
and competence of their communal sources.12 These conditions will not, however, be met 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 E.g. in the context of Judaism, Menachem Keller has recently argued that Judaism aims at a 
particular kind of life, one that trusts in God, not at the affirmation of particular beliefs: “if ‘belief’ is the 
intellectual acquiescence in carefully defined statements of dogma, the answer is that there is nothing that a Jew 
must believe.” (1999, 9) Cf. Wettstein’s exploration of naturalistic religious practice (and naturalistic Judaism in 
particular). (Wettstein 2012) 
11 Pew Research Center 2012, 11.  This includes the religiously unaffiliated, 71% of whom live in 
countries where the majority of people are religiously unaffiliated. 
12 This will particularly apply in the case of the central claims of their tradition. I am also leaving open 
the question of how the transmission of knowledge occurs. Some religions may be more hierarchical in 
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for all adherents. If adherents see religious sources as unrepresentative or as compromised 
by their concern for power and status or as unduly affected by factors extrinsic to what their 
religion really teaches, then the Trust Condition will not be met, even for those within the 
community. Given the importance of consistent practice for trustworthiness, religious 
sources that are seen as being hypocritical or behaving in ways that compromise their 
authority often prevent their claims from being received. 
 Finally, most religions also have worked out views on what their core commitments 
are, both theoretically (what is at the heart of their view of reality and the human place 
within it) and practically (what actions and ways of living are most important for us to 
pursue). Religious services and practices tend to focus on these central messages, with more 
esoteric and debated doctrines or teachings a matter of theological debate but less commonly 
a matter for sermons or key rituals. Further, this exposure may take place in a variety of 
settings and practices, all designed to help communicate the central messages. The emphasis 
on core teachings and the combination of teaching and practice characteristic of many 
religious communities puts them in a position to meet the Minimal Distortion Condition. 
Having clear and central claims that are passed on through teaching and practice increases 
the probability of successful transmission. 
4. Evidence for Successful Transmission of Religious Beliefs 
a. The Persistence of Some Maximally Counterintuitive Ideas 
As we saw above, Boyer suggests that religions are not going to be able to successfully 
transmit complex and counterintuitive beliefs over time. In fact, there are indications to the 
contrary. Whitehouse presents evidence for thinking that religions operating primarily in a 
doctrinal mode can effectively transmit their beliefs by maximizing the “relevance of ritually 
transmitted semantic knowledge in everyday settings.” (2004, 327) In such cases, the beliefs 
being passed on are not seen as inert and formulaic but of vital practical importance, 
avoiding the tedium effect. Doctrinal mode religions can also use the mechanism of “periodic 
arousal,” intense but regulated rituals that are closely connected to the doctrinal commitments 
of the religion because they “are typically subjected to extensive narrative rehearsal 
afterwards, prompted by orthodox interpretative concerns.” (327) Thus Whitehouse’s 
evaluation of the relevant evidence from anthropology and religious studies suggests, contra 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
knowledge transmission, with a defined top-down order of transmission, while others may be more egalitarian, 
with reciprocal transmission among members. 
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Boyer, that faithful transmission of even challenging religious concepts is possible. However, 
it can succeed only if the religious community is set up to successfully maintain the 
conditions necessary for accurate transmission. As Whitehouse notes, 
Policing can break down for a range of reasons. If the frequency of transmission is 
significantly reduced, if the authority of the tradition’s leaders deteriorates, if the 
sanctions for innovation and heresy are minimized, then the doctrinal mode may face 
extinction.  (Ibid., 327-328) 
 
So, when the community no longer meets the relevant conditions (ones quite similar to the 
three I have laid out), there will be a reversion to intuitive concepts. As Whitehouse puts it, 
“once the controls of doctrinal authorities and ritual experts fade, cognitively optimal 
concepts [i.e. MCIs] may be all that remains.” (328)13 
Christianity offers a good example of a religion that employs a doctrinal mode and has 
communities set up to faithfully transmit its central theological commitments.  Rituals such 
as the reciting of creeds as part of regular public worship and the development of detailed 
catechetical instruction help to pass on the central beliefs, including the counterintuitive 
ones. Similarly, emphases on an authoritative sacred text has made it problematic to deny the 
divinity or humanity of Jesus and led practitioners to defend the doctrine of the Trinity as 
the best way of maintaining the scriptural teachings on the unity of God and the distinctness 
of divine persons, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. The persistence of affirmations of these 
doctrines across the centuries provides significant evidence for some degree of success in 
transmission. 14  Absent repeated engagement with these texts and rituals and the 
communities that pass them on, CSR predicts that such maximally counterintuitive concepts 
would rapidly be dropped. The fact that they have persisted for many centuries, even in the 
face of Christian groups promoting less counter-intuitive theological views such as Arians 
and Unitarians, points to the success of these communal methods of transmission (Cf. 
Barrett 2004, chapter 6, Additional Factors). If such claims were not actually being received 
then we would expect Christian groups over time to significantly modify these doctrines: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 To give a scientific analogy, if physics were no longer widely taught and physicists lost their 
authority and standing, the cognitive science of science predicts that counterintuitive Newtonian or relativistic 
understandings of motion would quickly fade away until only naïve folk physics remains (cf. McCauley 2011). 
14 Now it is true that many actively practicing Christians would not do well when put to the question 
about the Trinity, particularly given limited time or opportunity for reflection. Barrett has found that under 
such conditions believers often switch to more intuitive, less theologically correct conceptions (Barrett 1999). 
However, this does not show that most Christians deny the Trinity, as it seems likely that in many contexts they 
are employing a less correct but easier to employ representation for practical purposes. 
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dropping them or simplifying them. While this has happened in a few Christian 
communities, the vast majority, from Orthodox to Catholics to Protestants, retain such 
beliefs and teach them as part of their religious instruction.    
b. Evidence from Comparing Nominal and Practicing Adherents 
Those who are only irregularly involved with a religious community have many fewer 
opportunities to take on religious knowledge in lasting ways. Sociological findings provide 
strong evidence for thinking that this difference in opportunities for formation has large 
effects on both the knowledge adherents have of their religion and the way they live their 
lives. On the theoretical side, in a 2015 US survey, significantly more practicing Protestants 
could correctly respond to questions about the Bible than those who identified as Christians 
but were non-practicing.15 On the practical side, W. Bradford Wilcox’s research on the 
United States finds a strong contrast based on practice: “evangelicals who attend religious 
services weekly, when compared with average Americans, are less likely to cohabit as young 
adults (1% vs. 10% of other young adults), to bear a child outside of wedlock (12% vs. 33% 
of other moms) and to divorce (7% vs. 9% of other married adults divorced from 1988 to 
1993).” So, regular participants adhere more closely to their professed moral norms than 
those in the general culture. On the other hand, Wilcox says, “nominal evangelicals have sex 
before other teens, cohabit and have children outside of wedlock at rates that are no 
different than the population at large, and are much more likely to divorce than average 
Americans.” 16 This suggests that religious participation and the knowledge it transmits make 
a real difference to people’s actual behavior. Those who are nominal adherents may either 
fail to receive the views of their professed community or be aware of them but not receive 
them as action-guiding practical knowledge.17  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Out of five multiple-choice options, 78% of practicing Protestants correctly picked Esther as a 
book in the Bible (compared to 49% of non-practicing Christians) and 74% picked Isaac as Abraham’s son 
(compared to 48% of non-practicing Christians). (American Bible Society 2015, 68-69) 
16 Wilcox 2007; cf. Stokes 2014 who shows that the correlation between divorce and conservative 
Protestant religiosity is negative for those who regularly attend services but positive for the nominal. The 
positive psychological benefits of religion that researchers have found also correlate with religious practice, not 
with affiliation. For more on the positive and negative roles of religion in America, see Putnam and Campbell 
2012. 
17 Of course, this requires that the transmission meet the necessary conditions: that the knowledge be 
clearly and consistently passed on by trusted sources. Some means of transmission may fail to meet these 
criteria. For example, a study found that for young American Catholics, attendance of Confraternity of 
Christian Doctrine or Catechism classes did “not correlate in any way with knowledge about Catholicism.” 
(Prothero 2008, 44) 
Cohoe w Getting Things Less Wrong http:// dx.doi.org/ 10.11612/ resphil.2016.93.3.3   13 
5. Minimal Distort ion  and Transmitting Practical Religious Knowledge 
When it comes to the practical sphere, the practical knowledge that religions seek to 
transmit has to be applied to the situations of people’s lives to be useful.18 This raises serious 
issues. Often, religious practical knowledge involves either applying quite general principles 
(e.g. love God first and love your neighbor as yourself) to specific situations  or taking rules 
and norms given in one situation and applying them to contemporary circumstances (e.g. 
Orthodox Jewish communities applying the Torah to life in this time and place, using the 
continuing tradition of rabbinical interpretation). The translation involved in this enterprise 
leaves significant scope for error, even if the initial principles are correct. 
While presenting challenges, the requirements for practical knowledge also allow for 
more flexibility when it comes to the representations employed. Practitioners who think that 
“God wants me to help this person in need” do not need an absolutely theological correct 
conception of God in order for that belief to be action guiding in a way that coheres with 
their theology. The representation that they are using or the heuristic they employ just needs 
to give the same verdict as the theologically correct concept. When the action performed and 
the motivation for performing it match up, then defects in the representation do not 
undermine the person’s practical knowledge or action. 
Practical transmission does, however, require that the implications of religious beliefs 
be discerned correctly. In addition to translation problems, there is an accomodationist 
worry: the prevailing attitudes of one’s society may corrupt or distort this transmission. The 
exposition and understanding put forward by leaders and the reception by members 
sometimes consists of ways of avoiding the practical implications of central religious 
teachings. This is a challenge that many theologians and preachers have expressed over the 
years (e.g. Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s Discipleship on the way Christians are tempted to anesthetize 
the message of Jesus [2003, 70-71/78-79]). A striking example comes from Martin Luther 
King’s Letter from a Birmingham Jail:  
[The early] church was not merely a thermometer that recorded the ideas and 
principles of popular opinion; it was the thermostat that transformed the mores of 
society. Wherever the early Christians entered a town the power structure got 
disturbed and immediately sought to convict them for being “disturbers of the 
peace” and “outside agitators.”…..Things are different now…..Far from being 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 While this issue arises in science as well (e.g. do findings about the benefits of a drug or diet apply 
to all humans or just those with certain characteristics) the design of studies are usually such that they at least 
attempt to include all the relevant populations. 
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disturbed by the presence of the church, the power structure of the average 
community is consoled by the church's often vocal sanction of things as they are. 
 
Here King is claiming that the church in America is no longer reflecting theologically correct 
Christian beliefs about power and oppression, but instead has distorted the Christian 
message to sanctify oppressive and un-Christian power structures. Transmission fails if 
religious teachings are heard and then acted on in a way that robs them of their force or 
distorts their content so that it is no longer providing helpful or correct instruction.19 
Knowledge only counts as practical when it can serve as the basis for action. Adherents need 
to do more than affirm beliefs as true on a survey. This sort of transmission is more difficult. 
Saying that you believe you should love your enemies is much easier than actually loving 
them. Thus meeting the Minimal Distortion Condition is particularly challenging in the case of 
practical religious knowledge.  
The difficulty seems particularly acute given the contemporary ecology of knowledge 
transmission.20 The huge number of sources on religious and moral views and the huge 
number of communities available for a given adherent to pick means that it can be easier to 
change your community than to conform to its views.21 Contemporary sociology suggests 
that, in the American context, many of those raised in particular religious communities end 
up with vague moral and religious views that are more similar to their peers than to those 
supposedly articulated by their communities.22 Based on thousands of interviews with young 
people in the United States, sociologist Christian Smith found that the dominant de facto 
creed is what he calls Moralistic Therapeutic Deism (MTD), which conceives of God as a 
being who rewards good people, encourages you to feel good about yourself but is not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 There is also those who, say, are pressured by their religious leaders to sell everything they have and 
give it to them, so the opposite can occur, it just is not the predominant issue. 
20 In highly hierarchical and controlled societies, by contrast, the most serious challenges might be 
more about whether the power and influence of the elites lead them to modify religious teaching to serve their 
own interests (this is still an issue, but the baseline of influence that religious institutions have is lower in the 
US than in some other societies, past and present). 
21 As societal pressures for religious belonging and participation decrease and more temporary and ad 
hoc forms of community, joined by those with the money and time to spare, become more common, the 
question is whether religious communities are capable of influencing their members in ways that are sufficient 
for forming them so as to successfully transmit theoretical and practical religious knowledge. This is a largely 
empirical question with a variety of answers relative to various religious communities and social contexts. 
22 Now, one question is what baseline we should be measuring against. Maybe current religious 
communities do not transmit knowledge well, but perhaps fare no worse than religious communities in 
America in the 19th century or in France in the 13th or Greece in the 5th century B.C. The further back we go 
the less direct evidence we have about the beliefs and practices of anyone outside the elite (and what the elite 
report about everyone else’s beliefs and practices). 
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particularly involved with the world except as a personal problem solver. (Smith 2010, 41-2) 
These beliefs are shared across a variety of formal religious identities.23 On this view, 
religious belief and practice is “about providing therapeutic benefits to its adherents.” (Ibid., 
42) Those interviewed mentioned concepts such as feeling good and achieving happiness 
much more frequently than specifically religious notions of sin, salvation, holiness, 
resurrection, or justice.24 
These beliefs and attitudes do not involve a new religion, they are instead about how 
adherents are receiving and appropriating the religious claims of their own tradition. As 
Smith puts it, “[MTD’s] typical embrace and practice is de facto, functional, practical, and 
tacit—not formal or acknowledged as a distinctive religion….[it] appears…to operate as a 
parasitic faith that cannot sustain its own independent life.” (43) Because Smith’s interviews 
were conducted under reflective and low cognitive load conditions, they allowed the subjects 
to display any theologically correct knowledge they might possess. So his research suggests 
that many of the subjects have not adopted the theologically correct concepts of their 
traditions into their own religious understandings. The Minimal Distortion Condition has not 
been met and transmission has failed. 
This challenge points to the importance of continuing adaptation by religious 
communities and institutions. Historians and sociologists of religion have identified many 
ways in which religious communities develop new practices or adapt old ones to attempt to 
pass on their teaching and practices. For example, as a result of the Industrial Revolution, 
many working class children in 18th century England worked six days a week, with no time 
for schooling, either secular or religious. English Anglican evangelical Robert Raikes (1725-
1811) developed Sunday school as an institution for working children who would learn to 
read and write by studying the Bible while also receiving catechetical instruction and 
participating in prayer and hymn-singing (Larsen 2008). This practice became widespread, 
adopted by a variety of Christian denominations across the globe, with the focus shifting to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 “[This] de facto creed is particularly evident among mainline Protestant and Catholic youth, but is 
also more than a little visible among black and conservative Protestants, Jewish teens, other religious types of 
teenagers, and even many “non-religious” teenagers in the USA.” (Smith 2010, 41) 
24 “We counted less than 50, and often less than 10, counts of concepts such as personally sinning or 
being a sinner, obeying God or the church, righteousness—divine or human, the kingdom of God, and loving 
one’s neighbor…. We found at least 20, and often close to 100, counts of the following concepts: personally 
feeling or being made happy, feeling good about oneself, and feeling personally satisfied or enjoying life 
satisfaction. Our interviewed teenagers used the single, specific phrase to “feel happy,” for instance, more than 
2,000 times.” (Smith 2010, 44) 
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religious education after the introduction of compulsory schooling. New practices and 
institutions can develop to transmit knowledge more effectively within the social 
environment. Thus, whether a religious community succeeds in transmitting its beliefs 
depends on how its ecology of knowledge adapts and develops over time to continue to 
successfully transmit its vision and practices in the relevant social context. 
6. Conclusion 
Communal institutions and their teaching and practices are vital to successfully 
transmitting knowledge. They can help members of the community assimilate challenging 
beliefs by presenting them repeatedly in a variety of contexts. Through an examination of 
religious beliefs, we have seen that communities are central to meeting the conditions for 
general transmission: Trust, Reinforced Exposure, and Minimal Distortion. Religious communities 
have a shared vision of reality and live together in a way that allows the believer to trust her 
fellow adherents, meeting the trust condition. The repeated practices and habits of the religious 
life help adherents to meet the reinforced exposure condition. Finally, religious communities offer 
comprehensive theoretical and practical guidance that distinguishes between the central 
elements and the more peripheral, helping to meet the minimal distortion condition. However, 
the challenges of translation and cultural accommodation make it difficult for communities 
to effectively pass on their action-guiding beliefs about how to live. While being an active 
member of a community does not guarantee understanding, it does put us in a position to 
have our errors and misconceptions corrected. A key part of intellectual humility is engaging 
with such communities, enabling us to benefit from the knowledge of others. It’s hard to get 
everything right, but with the help of others we can get things less wrong.25 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 This paper was made possible through the support of a grant from the John Templeton 
Foundation. The views expressed in it are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the 
John Templeton Foundation. 
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